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Abstract 
 Space systems are a critical enabler of the net-centric operation warfare (NCOW) 
needed to achieve victory in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).  The effective 
acquisition of affordable systems is vital to our National Security Strategy.  Space 
systems play an important role throughout a wide spectrum of military and civil 
operations.  Several challenging factors unique to space systems development are the 
high level of technological complexity, a broad joint user base, and the reliance on 
seamless interoperable systems to achieve superior capabilities for US warfighters.  This 
research examines the interaction between the Joint Capabilities Integration and 
Development System (JCIDS) and the National Security Space Acquisition Process 
(NSSAP) through a qualitative case study and identifies ways to improve this interaction 
by answering investigative questions and providing recommendations to be tested in 
future research. 
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REVIEW OF THE JOINT CAPABILITY INTEGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT 
SYSTEM (JCIDS) AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE ACQUISITION 
PROCESS (NSSAP) 
 
I.  Introduction 
1.1 Space System Criticality 
 Space systems are a critical enabler of the net-centric operation warfare (NCOW) 
needed to achieve victory in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).  A joint mix of 
ground, airborne, and space systems are required.  Joint airborne and space assets are 
required to achieve persistent, global intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) 
coverage.  Joint ground, airborne, and space assets are required to implement the Global 
Information Grid Bandwidth Expansion (GIG-BE) and are required for earth and space 
environment awareness.  Space is the only alternative for global position, navigation, and 
timing (PNT) coverage.  The affordable and timely acquisition of space systems is vital 
to a net-centric National Security Strategy. 
 Some claim that the process for acquiring effective military space systems (and 
military acquisitions at large) is broken, while others claim that the process works 
because US systems are still superior to those of other nations.  DoD’s concept of 
maintaining superiority through constant transformation makes this argument moot by 
recognizing that opportunities for improvement must be seized when presented. 
 Aside from the important role that space systems play across the spectrum of 
military and civil operations, space system acquisition must be continually reviewed and 
maintain a state of transformation to overcome several factors unique to space system 
acquisition. 
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1.2 Background 
 The Department of Defense (DoD) decision support systems guide the process of 
identifying the need for, acquiring, and financing materiel solutions when appropriate.  
These systems include the Joint Capabilities Integration & Development System 
(JCIDS), the Defense Acquisition System (DAS) or National Security Space Acquisition 
Process (NSSAP) for space systems, and the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and 
Execution (PPBE) Process.   
 Typically, DoD efforts to improve the overall process of acquiring a system have 
focused on only one of the decision support systems at a time, although the problems 
with the entire process may be attributed to how the decision support systems interact, 
rather than the internal structure of a single decision support system.  The most recent 
wave of reform measures affected the JCIDS and DAS.  In May 2003, DoD reissued the 
DoD 5000 series, including the DoD Directive 5000.1, DoD Instruction 5000.2, and DoD 
Defense Acquisition Guidebook with the major change being that evolutionary 
acquisition was identified as the preferred strategy for managing an acquisition program.  
In June 2003, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) 3170 series was reissued, 
replacing the Requirements Generation System (RGS) with the Joint Capability 
Integration and Development System (JCIDS).  The latest reform measure was the 
creation of the NSSAP and its guiding documentation, the National Security Space 
Acquisition Policy 03-01 (NSSAP 03-01), directing acquisition policy specifically for 
space systems. 
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1.3 Overview 
 This thesis looks at the interaction between the JCIDS and the NSSAP and 
identifies ways to improve these processes.  The remainder of this chapter will present 
the problem the thesis attempts to address and provide a brief description of the scope, 
methodology, limitations, and significance of this research.  Chapter Two will provide a 
literature review of current acquisition research, literature, and process documentation 
focusing on those items directly related to the JCIDS and NSSAP.  Chapter Three will 
describe the methodology for theory building from the qualitative case study.  The case 
study will be based on available literature, documentation, and interviews conducted in 
this research.  The results and recommendations will be presented and discussed in 
Chapter Four.  Conclusions and future research recommendations will be presented in 
Chapter Five.  
1.4 Problem 
 This thesis attempts to answer the question: what changes need to be made to 
enable more effective interaction between the National Security Space Acquisition 
Process (NSSAP) and the Joint Capabilities Integration & Development System (JCIDS) 
to field affordable space systems? 
 Ten investigative questions will be answered through the literature review and 
interviews to aid in developing recommendations to the above problem.  Those questions 
include: 
• What are the goals of an EA strategy? 
• What is an evolutionary acquisition (EA) strategy? 
• How is an EA strategy implemented?  
• What development processes are alternatives to evolutionary acquisitions? 
• What are capability-based acquisitions? 
  4
• What are the goals of a capability-based strategy? 
• How are capability-based acquisitions implemented? 
• How does the acquisition workforce view the documentation of JCIDS and 
NSSAP processes? 
 
1.5 Scope 
 The scope of research is within the capability level and program level.  The 
capability level includes capabilities that are delivered in a hierarchical and/or networked 
system-of-systems or independent system.  From the capability level, identifying possible 
areas for improvement within JCIDS requires examination of an Analysis-of-Alternatives 
(AoA) trade capability, the definition of capability areas, and the DoD Architecture 
Framework (DoDAF). 
 At the program level, this thesis examines the ability for a system’s horizontal 
integration with other systems, the integration of increments with other increments, and 
the ability of the acquisition strategy to reflect the entire scenario.  For specific examples, 
interviewees were asked to comment on any of three programs.  Those programs were the 
NAVSTAR Global Positioning System (GPS), the Space Based Infrared System 
(SBIRS), and the Transformational Satellite Communication (TSAT) System. 
1.6 Methodology 
 This thesis uses a qualitative case study to frame the gap between a capability-
based JCIDS and NSSAP and identify trade spaces in a number of areas which may 
improve the interaction between the systems.  The literature review examined research to 
date on the topic of project management, including both commercial and military 
practices, as well as available documentation of the DoD process and specific cases.  
Additional information was gathered from field interviews with various organizations 
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involved in the process.  After analyzing the interview and documentation data, a theory 
and recommendations are presented to the acquisition workforce in this thesis.  The thesis 
will be verified and validated in defense. 
1.7 Limitations 
 There are several limitations worth stating, although other limitations surely exist.  
The first is that only the interaction between the JCIDS and the DAS is examined.  The 
Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) Process is not examined to 
reduce the complexity of the thesis and because the PPBE Process is largely out of the 
DoD’s control. 
 Another limitation is the unique focus on space systems.  The results produced 
may vary with non-space programs.  Space systems are excellent candidates to make 
improvements in their acquisition process, due to their history of cost overruns and 
schedule slips.  In this thesis space system affordability is defines simply completing a 
program within budget.  Also, the seeming willingness to develop a system that addresses 
their specific needs as exemplified by the adoption of the NSSAP 03-01, and the 
characteristics of their systems that make capability-based “requirements,” systems-of-
systems architectures, and evolutionary strategies so appropriate makes this research 
appropriate. 
 Finally, the resulting recommendations, although based on the acquisition 
workforce interviews and documentation and reviewed in defense, will be untested in 
case study. 
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1.8 Significance 
 This work is highly significant because of its timely relevance and scope.  The 
question of how to improve the acquisition process is arguably one of the most important 
questions facing the space community, acquisition community, and DoD at large – it is a 
key component of defense transformation.  The resulting recommendations may serve as 
an outline of a blueprint for modifying the acquisition process to accommodate the new 
concept of capability-based acquisitions.   
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II. Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter will address the events and ideas leading to the development of the 
current Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) and National 
Security Space Acquisition Process (NSSAP) as described in the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff (CJCSI) Instruction/Manual (I/M)3170.01 and National Security Space 
Acquisition Policy 03-01 (NSSAP 03-01).  The chapter will provide a brief overview of 
the current decision support systems that make up the Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics process before highlighting some of the major ideas that characterize and 
history of the JCIDS and NSSAP, current areas of concern and research, and official 
documentation. 
2.2 DoD Decision Support Systems 
 According to the Defense Acquisition Guidebook (DAG, 2004), the purpose of 
the Department of Defense (DoD) Decision Support Systems is that “the three systems 
provide an integrated approach to strategic planning, identification of needs for military 
capabilities, systems acquisition, and program and budget development.”  The three 
systems include the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS), the 
Defense Acquisition System (DAS) for non-space programs or the National Security 
Space Acquisition Process (NSSAP) for space programs, and the Planning, 
Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) Process.  Each of these three systems 
are governed by different documentation and authorities, but frequently affect the same 
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people and events throughout the life time of an acquisition program, as illustrated by the 
use of a Venn Diagram in Figure 2.01. 
 
 
Figure 2.01 – DoD Decision Support Systems (DAG, 2004) 
 
Joint Capabilities 
Integration 
& Development 
System (JCIDS)
VCJCS/JROC
Oversight
Defense
Acquisition
System
Milestone Decision 
Authority (MDA)
Oversight
CJCS 3170.01 Series
DoDD 5000.1
DoDI 5000.2
DoD 7000.14-R
Planning,
Programming,
Budgeting,
& Execution 
(PPBE) Process
DEPSECDEF
Oversight
 
 As mentioned previously, the appropriate acquisition decision support systems for 
DoD space systems is the National Security Space Acquisition Process which replaces 
the Defense Acquisition System, or blue circle on the lower left, in the figure above.  
Also, some sources refer to the PPBE Process as the PPBE System (PPBES) such as the 
OSD Comptroller’s website.  These terms will be used interchangeably throughout this 
document.  A correct illustration of the decision support systems for space would look 
something like the image in Figure 2.02. 
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Figure 2.02 – DoD Decision Support Systems – Space (after DAG, 2004) 
 
Joint Capabilities 
Integration 
& Development 
System (JCIDS)
VCJCS/JROC
Oversight
National Security 
Space Acquisition 
Process (NSSAP)
USecAF as 
DoD Space MDA
Oversight
CJCS 3170.01 Series
DoDD 5000.1
NSSAP 03-01
Planning,
Programming,
Budgeting,
& Execution 
(PPBE) Process
DEPSECDEF
Oversight
DoD 7000.14-R
 
 In reality, the center overlap portion of the diagram is much larger and represents 
the area where all acquisition programs fall.  Constant interaction and coordination 
between all three systems results in the most effective acquisition programs (NSSAP 03-
01, 2004).   
2.2.1 Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) 
 The top, yellow circle represents the Joint Capabilities Integration and 
Development System (JCIDS).  Oversight for the JCIDS is provided by the Vice 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Requirements Oversight Council   The 
CJCSI CJCSM 3170.01 provide guidance for the JCIDS.  The JCIDS is “the systematic 
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method established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for assessing gaps in military joint 
warfighting capabilities and recommending solutions to resolve these gaps” (DAG, 
2004). 
2.2.2 National Security Space Acquisition Process (NSSAP)  
 In the above figures, the lower left, blue circle represents the Defense Acquisition 
System (DAS) or the National Security Space Acquisition Process (NSSAP).  The DAS 
is the process that guides acquisition programs (DAG, 2004) that meet capability 
deficiencies recognized by the JCIDS.  The NSSAP does this for space systems by taking 
into account the differences between space systems and terrestrial (including air) systems.  
Specifically, “the NSS model emphasizes the decision needs for ‘high-tech’ small 
quantity NSS programs, versus the DoD 5000 model that is typically focused on making 
the best large quantity production decision.  The funding profile for a typical NSS 
program is usually front-loaded when compared to a production-focused system. This 
requires the key decisions for a NSS program to be phased earlier than the typical DoD 
5000 milestone decisions” (NSSAP 03-01, 2004). 
 Oversight is the responsibility of the Milestone Decision Authority (MDA), like 
in the traditional Defense Acquisition System (DAS) for non-space programs.  However, 
unlike the DAS, the MDA for space programs is the Under Secretary of the Air Force 
(USecAF).  The National Security Space community includes the national intelligence 
community’s (IC) space programs, in addition to the DoD’s space programs.  However 
the IC acquisition policy is the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) Directive 82-2b, 
Acquisition Management - Directive 7, while DoD systems are governed by  the National 
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Security Space Acquisition Policy (again, NSSAP) 03-01 in place of the DAS’s DoDI 
5000.2.   
 The National Security Space Acquisition Process for DoD Space Systems is still 
governed by DoD Directive 5000.1 in addition to NSSAP 03-01.  The relationship with 
DoDI 5000.2 appears to be less clear.  NSSAP 03-01 (2004) makes mention in section 
3.3 of the space MDA’s right to waiver or exempt space programs from having to follow 
provisions of DoDI 5000.2 if a program submits a memorandum applying for such a 
waiver or exemption.  That excerpt is listed below: 
 
3.3 DoDI 5000.2 Waiver and Exemption 
The Space Milestone Decision Authority is authorized to 
approve waivers and exemptions to provisions of DoD 
instructions or publications, as defined by DoD Directive 
5025.1, to the extent that the instruction or publication, and 
its subject matter, are under the jurisdiction of 
USD(AT&L). To use this process, SPD/PMs can request a 
waiver through their PEO and CAE via a memo to the DoD 
Space MDA. Once the DoD Space MDA has granted the 
waiver and exemption, it remains valid for the life of the 
program unless the DoD Space MDA rescinds the waiver. 
(The DoD Space MDA waiver authority does not include 
DoDD 5000.1 or other DoD Directives.) For DoD Space 
Non-MDAPs, the appropriate CAE or CAE-designated 
representative (e.g., PEO) has the authority to establish 
basic acquisition practices and to act as the MDA following 
DoDI 5000.2 or this policy with approved waiver. (NSSAP 
03-01, 2004) 
 
 However, a memorandum from the Under Secretary of the Air Force states that 
“the NSS Acquisition Policy 03-01 falls under the authority of DoD Directive 5000.1 and 
will be used for DoD Space Major Defense Acquisition Programs, replacing processes 
and procedures described in the DoD Instruction 5000.2 under the jurisdiction of the 
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Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD-AT&L)” 
(USecAF, 2003).  
2.2.3 Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) Process 
 The Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) Process is “the 
Department's strategic planning, program development, and resource determination 
process. The PPBE process is used to craft plans and programs that satisfy the demands 
of the National Security Strategy within resource constraints” (DAG, 2004).  Oversight 
for the PPBE Process is provided by the Deputy Secretary of Defense.  Guidance is 
provided by DoD 7000.14-R. 
 Although the PPBE Process is one of the three DoD decision support systems, 
only the interaction between the JCIDS and the NSSAP will be examined in this research.  
The PPBE Process has greater external interaction than the other two systems in 
determining how the process operates.  Plus, setting aside the PPBE Process narrows the 
scope of the research to something more manageable given the time constraint to 
complete the research.   
2.3 Themes in Literature 
 Throughout the course of literature review, several themes or points of discussion 
became evident.  These themes were consistent among the majority of reviewed articles, 
though not necessarily grouped in the same manner.  The following sections provide a 
brief summary of some of the most common themes related to the JCIDS and NSSAP.  
Those themes are: 
• Acquisition Reform 
• Transformation, Modernization, and Recapitalization 
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• Capabilities v. Requirements 
• Technology 
• Evolutionary Acquisitions 
• Alternative System Development Strategies 
2.3.1 Acquisition Reform 
 One characteristic of today’s National Security Space Acquisition Process is its 
emergence from a 20-year reform effort.  Table 2.01 shows updates to the three decision 
support systems that make up the process of identifying needs and providing solutions to 
the warfighter.  Behind the updated documents in the table are countless memorandums, 
directives, codes, instructions, guides, references, architecture frameworks, public laws, 
circulars, and orders supporting various aspects of, or replaced by, the guiding 
documents.  Even without knowing all of these interim, supporting, or amending 
documents, a pattern in reform is evident from the top-level documents alone.  For 
example, the decision support documents of 1991 remained unchanged until 1996.  The 
documents from 1996 were changed by 1999 and have been changed every year since.  
Not only have the documents been reissued, but the document-types and names of the 
decision support system have changed since 1999. 
 Why the emphasis on reform?  “We have experienced breaches in nearly every 
major acquisition program and these breaches are unacceptable” (Lord, 2006).  Breaches 
mean violations of the terms specified in the Acquisition Program Baseline (APB) of a 
program, pertaining to cost, schedule, and performance.  In other words, many of our 
systems are over cost, behind schedule, and failing to meet original performance 
requirements.   
 This is not news to the space community.  Air Force Space Command’s (AFSPC) 
quarterly journal High Frontier, dedicated its entire January issue to the subject of space 
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Table 2.01 – Changes in the Decision Support Systems in the Last Fifteen Years 
1991 Requirements Generation System 
CJCS MOP 77 
Acquisition Management System 
DoD 5000 Series, 1991 
Planning, Programming, 
Budgeting System 
DoDD 7045.14, 1984 
1992 Requirements Generation System 
CJCS MOP 77 
Acquisition Management System 
DoD 5000 Series, 1991 
Planning, Programming, 
Budgeting System 
DoDD 7045.14, 1984 
1993 Requirements Generation System 
CJCS MOP 77 
Acquisition Management System 
DoD 5000 Series, 1991 
Planning, Programming, 
Budgeting System 
DoDD 7045.14, 1984 
1994 Requirements Generation System 
CJCS MOP 77 
Acquisition Management System 
DoD 5000 Series, 1991 
Planning, Programming, 
Budgeting System 
DoDD 7000.14, 1994 
1995 Requirements Generation System 
CJCS MOP 77 
Acquisition Management System 
DoD 5000 Series, 1991 
Planning, Programming, 
Budgeting System 
DoDD 7000.14, 1994 
1996 
 
Requirements Generation System 
CJCS MOP 77 
Acquisition Management System 
DoD 5000 Series, 1996 
Planning, Programming, 
Budgeting System 
DoDD 7000.14, 1994 
1997 Requirements Generation System 
CJCS MOP 77 
Acquisition Management System 
DoD 5000 Series, 1996 
Planning, Programming, 
Budgeting System 
DoDD 7000.14, 1994 
1998 Requirements Generation System 
CJCS MOP 77 
Acquisition Management System 
DoD 5000 Series, 1996 
Planning, Programming, 
Budgeting System 
DoDD 7000.14, 1994 
1999 Requirements Generation System 
CJCS 3170 Series, 1999 
Acquisition Management System 
DoD 5000 Series, 1996 
Planning, Programming, 
Budgeting System 
DoDD 7000.14, 1994 
2000 Requirements Generation System 
CJCS 3170 Series, 1999 
Defense Acquisition System 
DoD 5000 Series, 2000 
Planning, Programming, 
Budgeting System 
DoDD 7000.14, 2000 
2001 Requirements Generation System 
CJCS 3170 Series, 2001 
Defense Acquisition System 
DoD 5000 Series, 2000 
Planning, Programming, 
Budgeting System 
DoDD 7000.14, 2001 
2002 Requirements Generation System 
CJCS 3170 Series, 2001 
Defense Acquisition System 
DoD 5000 Series, 2002 
Planning, Programming, 
Budgeting System 
DoDD 7000.14, 2002 
2003 
 
Joint Capabilities Integration & 
Decision System 
CJCS 3170 Series, 2003 
Defense Acquisition System 
DoD 5000 Series, 2003 & National 
Security Space Acquisition Process 
NSSAP 03-01, 2003 
Planning, Programming, 
Budgeting, and Execution 
Process 
DoDD 7000.14, 2002 
2004 Joint Capabilities Integration & 
Decision System 
CJCS 3170 Series, 2004 
Defense Acquisition System 
DoD 5000 Series, 2003 & National 
Security Space Acquisition Process 
NSSAP 03-01, 2004 
Planning, Programming, 
Budgeting, and Execution 
Process 
DoDD 7000.14, 2002 
2005 Joint Capabilities Integration & 
Decision System 
CJCS 3170 Series, 2005 
Defense Acquisition System 
DoD 5000 Series, 2003 & National 
Security Space Acquisition Process 
NSSAP 03-01, 2004 
Planning, Programming, 
Budgeting, and Execution 
Process 
DoDD 7000.14, 2002 
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acquisitions, past, present, and future.  Within the 56 pages, 13 senior space professionals 
described past problems and circumstances and present day factors that have led to the 
outcome of today’s “over cost, behind schedule, and below performance” reality for 
many space programs.  Both Gen Lord and LtGen Hamel sited events in the 1990s as 
contributors to today’s problems.  "Acquisition reform errors of the 1990s left us with a 
severe lack of expertise in cost estimating, system engineering, and program 
management" (Lord, 2006).  And, “in the early 1990s, the Cold War ended, defense 
budgets were cut…the Air Force systemically cut back its development and acquisition 
workforce and delayed its recapitalization plans” (Hamel, 2006).  They also pointed out 
improvements that could or had already been made and all presented an impression of 
hopefulness for the future.  BrigGen Pawlikowski concluded her article by summarizing 
the space acquisition community’s mission.  “We must deliver systems that are fully 
integrated into effects capability even if that means leading multiple diverse programs 
within a concurrent development environment. This is our mission in support of our 
warfighters; failure is not an option.  The space acquisition community is postured to 
meet this mission. We will overcome the devastating effects of the experiments in 
acquisition reform in the 1990s.”  
 Many of the authors cited a number of reports on acquisition reform when 
discussing the basis for their recommendations.  While the experiences and opinions of 
senior leadership is valuable, these reports are the most rigorous research on the subject 
of acquisition reform.  In the last twenty years, countless organizations and panels have 
looked at the issues surrounding acquisition reform, such as the 1986 Blue Ribbon 
Commission—“Packard Commission,” the 1990s DSB reports, the 2000 Launch Broad 
  16
Area Review, the 2001 Space Commission Report—“Rumsfeld Commission,” the 2003 
Defense Science Board—“Young Panel,” and most recently the 2005 Defense 
Acquisition Performance Assessment (DAPA) Project.  In addition to all of these, the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) has provided a number of valuable reports 
pertaining to space acquisition reform.  
The following sections examine those findings and recommendations that pertain 
specifically to the JCIDS and NSSAP and were present in other articles and research.  
One item that was not present in literature, other than in the commission report, but was a 
frequent topic in interviews was a recommendation from the Young Panel.  The Young 
Panel recommended that the space funding profile should represent 80% for development 
and production and 20% for operations and maintenance with a 25% margin for program 
managers.  Another interesting characteristic of the recommendations and problems 
identified by senior leadership and expert panels is that at times the findings are very 
similar to those of the past and at other times, the exact opposite action is prescribed.  For 
example, the concept of Total System Performance Responsibility (TSPR) was a strategy 
used to procure SBIRS, based on 1994 DAS policy (then called Acquisition Management 
System).  LtGen Michael Hamel commented that “the responsibility for program 
management was largely shifted to, and shouldered by, the defense industry. The 
construct was known as Total System Performance Responsibility, wherein industry was 
expected to deliver end-to-end systems. Defense contractors were given broad authority 
to interpret performance requirements, define system designs, establish statements of 
work and deliverable items, and use commercial ‘best practices.’” (Hamel, 2006)  LtGen 
Hamel continued to say that the concept resulted in lack of government oversight and 
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mission failure.  However, in 2003, Dr. Addelston made a compelling case for using it to 
allow contractors to develop end-to-end system-of-systems based on a government 
CONOPS (Addelston, 2003).  This fluctuation may reflect the difficulty in developing a 
comprehensive system that is still flexible or it may indicate that something else is wrong 
other than the system.   
2.3.2 Transformation, Modernization, and Recapitalization  
 Another theme prevalent in many articles focusing on all processes associated 
with DoD acquisitions, is the concept of “Transformation.”  Transformation simply 
means to change or modernize many aspects of the DoD to be more flexible to threats 
(Myers, 2001).  The Defenselink Transformation website provides the following 
overview to describe transformation: 
The Sept. 11, 2001, terror attacks on the United States 
accelerated the need to transform to better meet the 
challenges of the 21st century, thus, sustain American 
competitive advantage in warfare. 
 
Transformation is foremost a continuing process that does 
not have an end point. It is meant to create or anticipate the 
future. Transformation is meant to deal with the co-
evolution of concepts, processes, organizations and 
technology. Change in any one of these areas necessitates 
change in all.  
 
Transformation is meant to create new competitive areas 
and new competencies. It is meant to identify, leverage and 
even create new underlying principles for the way things 
are done. Transformation is meant to identify and leverage 
new sources of power. The overall objective of these 
changes is simply – sustained American competitive 
advantage in warfare. (Defenselink Transformation 
Website, 2006) 
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Transformation was not born from the 9-11 terror attacks.  It was included in the 
Space Commission’s January 2001 Report.  The Space Commission defined it similarly 
as to “develop, deploy, and maintain the means to deter attack on and to defend 
vulnerable space capabilities…this requires a deterrence strategy for space, which in turn 
must be supported by a broader range of space capabilities” (Space Commission, 2001).  
The Space Commission defined these capabilities necessary to space transformation as: 
Deterrence and Defense, Policy for Space Assured Access to Space and On-Orbit 
Operations, Space Situational Awareness, Earth Surveillance from Space, Global 
Command, Control and Communications in Space, Defense in Space, Homeland 
Defense, and Power Projection In, From, and Through Space  (Space Commission, 
2001). 
 In fact, the concept of transformation, or modernization, has been around for 
some time.  A Feb 1995 DoD news release on the FY 1996-97 Defense Budget quoted 
Secretary Perry saying that the budget would be used in part for “prudent weapons 
modernization” (DoD, 1995).   The article later substituted recapitalization for 
modernization when it said that “The new budget plans also begin the ‘recapitalization’ 
of U.S. forces--that is, the modernization of weapons and equipment, after several years 
in which the Department lived off its Cold War stocks of equipment” (DoD, 1995).  And 
even as recently as June of 2005, while testifying before the Senate Armed Services 
Committee (SASC) during his confirmation hearing, Gen Moseley stated that 
recapitalization of the aging aircraft fleet was his third priority (third to improving joint 
warfighting and strengthening Air Force people) (Gettle, 2005). 
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 The concepts of modernizing, recapitalization, and transformation as synonyms is 
not new. However, today’s usage implies that recapitalization specifically applies to 
modernizing weapon systems after a period of allowing systems to remain at the status 
quo and fall behind state of the art.  Transformation has also become more clearly 
defined.  In 2003, the Secretary of Defense published the Transformation Planning 
Guidance.  Within the document, Secretary Rumsfeld stated that transformation is more 
than modernizing weapon systems in that it includes continually transforming our people, 
processes, and military forces “so that our armed forces are always several steps ahead of 
any potential adversary” and can react quickly to whatever the threat may be including 
terrorist attacks, cyber-war attacks, traditional state-on-state attacks, etc.  (DoD TPG, 
2003).   
The document also specifies that transformation efforts will occur in three areas: 
how we fight, how we do business, and how we work with others (DoD TPG, 2003).  
Transforming how we fight means supporting the four pillars of transformation identified 
in the 2001 QDR and pictured in Figure 2.03. 
 
Figure 2.03 – 2001 QDR Transformation Pillars (DoD TPG, 2003) 
  20
Strengthening 
Joint Operations
Exploiting 
U.S. Intelligence 
Advantages
Developing 
Transformational 
Capabilities.
Experimenting 
in Support of New 
Warfighting Concepts
 
 
The Office of Force Transformation has established the following five goals, which 
closely mirror those of the 2001 QDR and support the pillars.  Those goals are listed 
below: 
1. Make force transformation a pivotal element of national 
defense strategy and DoD corporate strategy effectively 
supporting the four strategic pillars of the national military 
strategy. 
 
2. Change the force and its culture from the bottom up 
through the use of experimentation, transformational 
articles (operational prototyping) and the creation and 
sharing of new knowledge and experiences. 
 
3. Implement Network Centric Warfare (NCW) as the theory 
of war for the information age and the organizing principle 
for national military planning and joint concepts, 
capabilities and systems. 
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4. Get the decision rules and metrics right and cause them to 
be applied enterprise wide. 
 
5. Discover, create or cause to be created new military 
capabilities to broaden the capabilities base and mitigate 
risk. (Office of Force Transformation Website, 2005) 
 
Transforming how we do business includes a number of efforts; most notable is 
“adaptive planning, a more entrepreneurial, future-oriented capabilities-based resource 
allocation planning process, accelerated acquisition cycles built on spiral development, 
output-based management, and a reformed analytic support agenda” (DoD TPG, 2003).  
Furthermore, reforming the acquisition process is a top priority (DoD TPG, 2003).  “The 
Department [of Defense] is reducing acquisition cycle time and aligning acquisition with 
a new capabilities-based resource allocation process built around joint operating 
concepts. Instead of building plans, operations and doctrine around individual military 
systems as often occurred in the past, henceforth the Department will explicitly link 
acquisition strategy to future joint concepts in order to provide the capabilities necessary 
to execute future operations” (DoD TPG, 2003). 
 Acquisition reform, whether a new concept or not, was clearly needed as 
demonstrated by the multitude of GAO, DSB, and other special panels chartered to look 
at the Acquisition process discussed in section 2.2.1.  That need was brought to the 
forefront after the events of 9-11 demonstrated interagency communication weaknesses 
and drastically different threats than DoD had prepared for through traditional methods of 
adjusting Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, and 
Facilities (DOTMLPF).  Therefore, the concept of transformation, though introduced 
before 9-11, gained substantial support because it represented more than system 
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modernization or recapitalization.  It also emphasized joint activities, the development of 
a net-centric environment, and promoting changes across the DOTMLPF spectrum. 
2.3.3 Capabilities v. Requirements 
  In May of 2003, the Joint Capabilities Integration & Development System 
(JCIDS) replaced the Requirements Generation System (RGS) decision support system.  
According to a briefing given by the Joint Staff, the former RGS had a number of 
shortcomings including producing stove-piped systems that were not integrated with 
other systems; producing service oriented requirements, rather than joint focused; lacking 
an objective construct for proposal analyses; duplication of efforts in smaller programs; 
and unprioritized joint warfighting needs.  (Joint Staff / J8, 2005)  Figure 2.04 compares 
the former RGS with the new JCIDS. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.04 – RGS v. JCIDS Comparison (Joint Staff / J8, 2005) 
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 In addition to the top-down, joint-approach, an additional JCIDS characteristic is 
the prevalent use of the term “capability” and the reduced use of the term “requirements.”  
This has led to discussion on what exactly is meant by capability and related terms such 
as capability-based acquisitions.  The governing document for the JCIDS process, CJCSI 
3170 defines a capability [as] “the ability to achieve a desired effect under specified 
standards and conditions through combinations of means and ways to perform a set of 
tasks” (CJCSI 3170, 2005).  Air Force Instruction 10-601, Capabilities Based 
Requirements Development, defines capability as “the ability to execute a specified 
course of action.  It is defined by an operational user and expressed in broad operational 
terms in the format of an initial capabilities document (ICD) or a DOTMLPF change 
recommendation.  In the case of materiel proposals, the definition will progressively 
  24
evolve to DOTMLPF performance attributes identified in the [capability development 
document] CDD and the [capability production document] CPD” (AFI 10-601, 2004).  
The DoD Dictionary defines capability as “the ability to execute a specified course of 
action. (A capability may or may not be accompanied by an intention.)”  AFI 63-101, 
Operations of Capability Based Acquisition System and AFPD 63-1, Capability-Based 
Acquisition System do not define or refer to definitions of a capability.   
The failure to adopt joint capability-based acquisitions in implementation and 
across services was noted in a recent report by the Government Accountability Office, 
titled “DoD Management Approach and Process Not Well-Suited to Support 
Development of Global Information Grid (GIG).”  In the report, the GAO stated that 
“DoD program management and acquisition oversight tend to focus on individual 
programs and not necessarily on synchronizing multiple programs to deliver 
interdependent systems at the same time, as required to achieve the intended capability” 
(GAO, 2006). 
 An additional characteristic of the JCIDS is the option of using an architecture 
made of family-of-systems (FoS) or system-of-systems (SoS) as solutions.  CJCSI 
identifies FoS and SoS as follows: 
Family of Systems - A set of systems that provide similar 
capabilities through different approaches to achieve similar 
or complementary effects. For instance, the warfighter may 
need the capability to track moving targets. The FoS that 
provides this capability could include unmanned or manned 
aerial vehicles with appropriate sensors, a space-based 
sensor platform or a special operations capability. Each can 
provide the ability to track moving targets, but with 
differing characteristics of persistence, accuracy, 
timeliness, etc. 
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System of Systems - A set or arrangement of 
interdependent systems that are related or connected to 
provide a given capability. The loss of any part of the 
system will significantly degrade the performance or 
capabilities of the whole. The development of a SoS 
solution will involve trade space between the systems as 
well as within an individual system performance. An 
example of a SoS would be a combat aircraft. While the 
aircraft may be developed as a single system, it could 
incorporate subsystems developed for other aircraft. For 
example, the radar from an existing aircraft may be 
incorporated into the one being developed rather than 
developing a new radar. The SoS in this case would be the 
airframe, engines, radar, avionics, etc. that make up the 
entire combat aircraft capability.  (CJCSI 3170.01, 2005) 
  
 The concept of joint, net-centric, SoS or FoS architectures has caused a number of 
organizations to take a look at several areas within DoD acquisitions aside from those 
associated with the oversight and review processes detailed in CJCSI 3170 and NSSAP 
03-01.  In February of 2004, the National Defense Industrial Association (NDIA) 
Systems Engineering Division Modeling & Simulation (M&S) Community published 
their findings on M&S support and how it related to the new DoD 5000 series.  The 
report had:  
• 13 findings on the systems engineering process 
• 35 findings regarding M&S  
• four recommendations on the use of M&S   
• 12 recommendations on enabling the use of M&S (NDIA, 2004)   
 
 In April of 2005, the Aerospace Corporation published a draft rewrite of Military 
Standard 499C, Systems Engineering—its first update since 1974.  The document is one 
example of LtGen Hamel’s “comprehensive fixes” at Space and Missile Systems Center 
(SMC).  “These comprehensive fixes include reestablishing systems engineering 
discipline, critical development processes, tailored military specifications and 
standards…” (Hamel, 2006).  In addition to the implications of capability-based 
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acquisitions on SE and M&S, testing and evaluation (T&E) is also under review.  Col 
Eileen Bjorkman is the Joint Test & Evaluation Methodology (JTEM) Feasibility Study 
Director charged with “developing methods and processes for testing in a Joint 
environment” (Bjorkman, 2005). As is the case with many Joint Acquisition activities, 
Bjorkman says that relationships need to be established among competing processes and 
organizations (Bjorkman, 2005). 
2.3.4 Technology 
The role of technology in the acquisition processes was another strong theme for 
discussion in the literature.  These discussions included the military lag behind the 
commercial world in technological advancements, DoD’s lag behind national space 
systems, and incorporating immature technology into DoD systems. 
A number of articles and reports highlighted a need “to give DOD access to those 
technologies, products, and processes which are dominated by the commercial market 
place. Electronics, software, computer systems, telecommunications, and flexible 
manufacturing are example areas where commercial technology is far more advanced 
than military technology” (DSB 1993). 
Some articles stated that there was too much technology development during the 
acquisition life cycle.  In a speech given to a graduating class of the Defense Systems 
Management Course, Mr. John Wilson said that the Acquisition community needed to 
consciously separate technology development from acquisition (Johnson, 1999). 
The 1993 DSB sited one problem with the acquisition process as “assuming ‘this 
will be the last new system for the next two decades,’ and including all new (often 
unproven) technology at the start of full-scale development, and adding new requirements 
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to this same system over time” (DSB, 1993).  Similarly, Mr. Wilson said “Because we 
expect each generation of technology to be a revolutionary leap ahead of the last 
generation, we try to fund requirements ten to fifteen years in the future.  As the F-22 
example demonstrates, not only does this practice cause us to design systems based on 
our best guess of future threats and technology, which is often inaccurate, but it also 
extends cycle times by making us repeatedly revise the program to incorporate new 
developments” (Johnson, 1999).  This problem begs the question: should defense system 
technology be revolutionary or evolutionary? 
According to the 1999 DSB, “there have been few revolutionary programs in the 
past, that have succeeded without the strong support of the owning Service.  Major 
change almost always involves some leadership group who perceives a pending crisis.  If 
the DoD wants to make change, it must recognize the difficulty of sustaining funding 
support for revolutionary changes, and then provide the leadership for giving such 
programs funding stability” (DSB 1999).  Gen Hamel, among others (Sugar, 2006) 
(Stevens, 2006), feel that “program stability is essential if we are to avoid continuous re-
planning and re-baselining, which inevitably causes delays and cost growth” (Hamel, 
2006). 
2.3.5 Evolutionary Acquisitions (EA)    
 Many believe that an evolutionary strategy, as opposed to a single step strategy 
providing revolutionary change, will solve Acquisition’s problem of lengthy acquisition 
cycle time.  The Packard Commission stated that “an unreasonable long acquisition cycle 
of 10 to 15 years for major weapons systems is a central problem from which most other 
acquisition problems stem” (Packard, 1986) including obsolete technology, cost growth, 
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and “gold plated” defense systems (Packard, 1986).  Cycle time is the length of time it 
takes to go from program initiation to initial operational capability (IOC) (Johnson, 
1999).  Figure 2.05 depicts the concept of acquisition cycle time according to the 1999 
DSB.   
 
Figure 2.05 – Acquisition Cycle Time (DSB, 1999) 
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“Rather than aiming for a 100% solution that takes 20 years to complete, they will strive 
for an 80% solution that can be fielded to the troops faster and at affordable prices.” 
(Farrell, 2002)  DoD supported this notion by stating that Evolutionary Acquisition (EA) 
was the preferred method for acquiring weapon systems in the 2003 reissuance of the 
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DoD 5000 series.  The NSSAP 03-01 followed suit, also stating that EA was the 
preferred method for developing space systems. 
 What is EA?  According to DoDI 5000.2,  
 
An evolutionary approach delivers capability in increments, 
recognizing, up front, the need for future capability 
improvements. The objective is to balance needs and 
available capability with resources, and to put capability 
into the hands of the user quickly. The success of the 
strategy depends on consistent and continuous definition of 
requirements, and the maturation of technologies that lead 
to disciplined development and production of systems that 
provide increasing capability towards a materiel concept…. 
The approaches to achieve evolutionary acquisition require 
collaboration between the user, tester, and developer. They 
include:  
 
Spiral Development - In this process, a desired capability is 
identified, but the end-state requirements are not known at 
program initiation. Those requirements are refined through 
demonstration and risk management; there is continuous 
user feedback; and each increment provides the user the 
best possible capability. The requirements for future 
increments depend on feedback from users and technology 
maturation. 
 
Incremental Development - In this process, a desired 
capability is identified, an end-state requirement is known, 
and that requirement is met over time.  (DoDI 5000.2, 
2003) 
 
 
 NSSAP 03-01 defines EA similarly and goes on to say that “evolutionary 
acquisition has been a cornerstone for space system development since the early 1960’s” 
(NSSAP, 2004) even though the recognition in DoD has been fairly recent and can be 
traced back to DoD computer system acquisition (Farkas, 2003).   
Traces of an evolutionary concept can be found dating back to the 1930s when 
Walter Shewhart of Bell Labs proposed a series of small “Plan-Do-Study-Act” cycles, a 
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concept referred to as PDSA, to improve the quality of products.  (Larman, 2003)  W. 
Edwards Deming, also a quality expert, promoted PDSA in the 1940s and included it in 
his 1986 book Out of the Crisis (Deming, 1986).  In the 1950s, the X-15 hypersonic jet 
incorporated an iterative and incremental development, or IID, strategy.  NASA credited 
some of the success of the project to the IID strategy.  The IID strategy was also used on 
NASA’s software for the Project Mercury program (Larman, 2003).  It was in the mid-
1950s that IID became widely accepted in the software programming community.  In 
1976, Tom Gilb introduced the concept of evolutionary project management and in the 
mid-1980s TRW’s Barry Boehm coined the term “Spiral Development” (Larman, 2003).  
Figure 2.06 illustrates Boehm’s concept of spiral development.  
In the spiral model, the desired capability is achieved at the end of the entire 
spiral.  Boehm’s model releases prototypes for testing, but does not consider them to be 
solutions.  Some consider the spiral model to be a system production model (Unger, 
2003) but apply different steps than the one developed by Boehm.  Unger describes 
product development models that use time or budget constraints to mark the end of a 
development phase.  The automobile industry for example, makes a number of upgrades 
or modifications in about 18 months, fast enough to have a new edition of the Ford 
Explorer available each year.  This is an example of time-block product development and 
an evolutionary strategy, but it is made possible through a fairly mature prototype that 
remains constant.  Software engineering is another industry that releases mature 
prototypes without requiring too many spirals. 
Figure 2.06 – Spiral Development (Boehm, 2001) 
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The National Security Space Acquisition Process’ application treats prototypes as 
militarily useful, improved capability systems that may or may not be brought to the 
same level as the final capability, when the spiral is completed. The ability to bring an 
earlier system to the same level as a new system presents problems for space systems 
since only software can be upgraded on a launched satellite at this time.  Capability is 
generally added in following generations of satellites by designing them to be backward 
compatible with earlier generations. 
 This may seem similar to block development or preplanned product improvement 
(P3I) and in some ways, it is; which is why the space community says that they have been 
using EA strategies for years (NSSAP 03-01, 2004).  Pete Aldridge published the 
following definitions: 
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Increment or Block - A militarily useful and supportable 
operational capability that can be effectively developed, 
produced or acquired, deployed, and sustained.  Each 
increment of capability will have its own set of thresholds 
and objectives set by the user. 
 
Preplanned Product Improvement - A traditional 
acquisition strategy that provides for adding improved 
capability to a mature system.  (Aldridge, 2002)  
 
In DoD’s application of EA, EA (spiral or incremental), block development, and P3I 
ALL result in blocks or increments.  The difference is in the expected capability.  EA 
shoots for an 80% solution upgraded over time, block shoots for a 100% solution with 
each successive block, and P3I shoots for a 100% solution with planned upgrades to 
follow (Farkas & Farmer, 2005).  Figure 2.07 is from Crosstalk Magazine and attempts to 
capture these concepts (Crosstalk, 2002). 
 
Figure 2.07 – EA Visualization (Crosstalk, 2002) 
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Mr. David Brown, of the Technology and Engineering Department in the Defense 
Acquisition University (DAU), briefed the following figure at the 2005 Space Systems 
Engineering and Acquisition Excellence Forum. 
 
 
Figure 2.08 – Linear Sequential Acquisition Process v. Evolutionary Acquisition Process 
(Brown, 2005) 
 
  
2.3.6 System Development Strategies 
 To software and systems engineers, as well as civilian project managers, 
traditional, spiral, and incremental development are defined and illustrated differently 
than the DoD definitions.  To the DoD, the use of spiral or incremental development is 
determined by knowledge of an end state.  DoD deploys improved usable systems at the 
end of a development phase.  Adding to some of the confusion, aside from definitions 
differing from the systems engineering community or commercial practices, is the 
inconsistency in images to portray DoD’s definitions.  The following sections address 
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various development strategies used commercially, grounded in systems engineering, 
software development, and project management practices.    
 The Project Management Institute summarizes a number of development methods 
in a paper titled “Software Development and Linearity.”   The paper describes “generally 
accepted” (Wideman, 2003) program management practices in software development, 
which is appropriate for all DoD space systems because of their software complexity and 
the push towards interoperability in a joint community through netcentricity.   
 The first model discussed is the waterfall model, picture in Figure 2.09; the 
waterfall model is also pictured in Figure 2.09 as the linear-sequential acquisition 
process.  Wideman describes “good” and “not so good” features of the waterfall model.  
 
Figure 2.09 – The Waterfall Model (Buede, 2000) 
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Good Features: 
• The waterfall approach has been around for a long time, and many people 
are familiar and comfortable with it. 
• It is simple and easily understood. 
• It does recognize the need to move one stage at a time and recycle back to 
the previous stage to validate the stage outcome.  (Wideman, 2003) 
 
Not So Good Features: 
• The waterfall model approach does not satisfy the requirement for 
executive control. 
• It is very difficult to manage under conditions of complexity. 
• In the waterfall approach, integration and testing is generally left until the 
end.  That’s when “all the chickens come home to roost,” with disastrous 
effect on project cost and schedule.  (Wideman, 2003) 
 
 The second model discussed is the “Vee Model” pictured in Figure 2.10.  The 
National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) uses a similar model.  That model is pictured in 
Figure 2.11 with an overlay showing when key reviews take place. 
Good Features: 
• Most people who have an engineering background are very comfortable 
with the systems approach. 
• It is very good wherever it is possible to describe, i.e. specify, the 
requirements with  high degree of certainty 
• The acquiring authority requires a thoroughly well-documented track 
record or audit trail 
• Consequently, it is popular with big government departments,… 
• Where money is not the limiting criteria, though competitive bidding 
might be.  (Wideman, 2003) 
 
Not So Good Features: 
• The process is heavy on documentation. 
• It assumes that it is possible to arrive at near-perfect documentation that is 
complete, and is truly representative of the ultimate “requirements,”… 
• And can be frozen, and the authors, i.e. the stakeholders, can be held 
accountable to those requirement specifications.  (Wideman, 2003) 
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Figure 2.10 – The Vee Model (Buede, 2000) 
 
Figure 2.11 – The NRO Vee Model (NRO, 2000) 
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 The third model discussed is the spiral model.  Wideman points out that spiral 
development means different things to different people (Wideman, 2003) but takes the 
most classical view in his interpretation that it consists of four management processes 
with four cycles through those processes (Wideman, 2003).  The four phases are: 
identify, design, construct, and evaluate.  The four cycles are:  
Proof-of-concept cycle — define the business goals, 
capture the requirements, develop a conceptual design, 
construct a "proof-of-concept", establish test plans, conduct 
a risk analysis. Share results with user.  
 
First-build cycle — derive system requirements, develop 
logic design, construct first build, evaluate results. Share 
results with user.  
 
Second-build cycle — derive subsystem requirements, 
produce physical design, construct second build, evaluate 
results. Share results with user.  
 
Final-build cycle — derive unit requirements, produce final 
design, construct final build, test all levels. Seek user 
acceptance.  (Wideman, 2003) 
 
Good Features:  
• In this approach, the entire application is built working with the user. 
• Any gaps in requirements are identified as work progresses into more 
detail. 
• The process is continued until the code is finally accepted. 
• The diagrammatic representation, i.e. the spiral, does convey very clearly 
the cyclic nature of the process. 
• And it also conveys the progression through the project life plan. 
(Wideman, 2003) 
 
Not So Good Features: 
• This approach requires serious discipline on the part of the users. 
• If the users are not responsible for the schedule and budget, as very often 
they are not, executive control can be difficult. 
• For a software developer working under a firm-price contract, it may be 
impossible. 
• The model depicts four cycles.  However, if cycles are added indefinitely 
for “just one more tweak” then eventually…Everyone gives up in 
frustration! 
  38
• Or, the time and money runs out.(Wideman, 2003) 
 
 Like Wideman, Boehm and Brown both warn against incorporating too many 
spirals, or creating a program management “death spiral” (Brown, 2004) resulting in 
running out of patience, time, and money; however, DoD’s definition of spiral 
development makes no stipulation as to the end date for a capability or system 
development. 
 Buede discusses a fourth development model that seems to more closely resemble 
the chart published by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics (USD(AT&L)) illustrating the interaction between the three decision support 
systems.  This model describes incremental development using the Vee Model and is 
pictured below in Figure 2.12.  Under this model, a useful subset of the system is 
produced initially followed by upgrades and system expansions until the entire system is 
operational. (Buede, 2000)  This definition seems most similar to the DoD definition for 
Spiral and Incremental Development, without referring to the user’s role or knowledge of 
the desired end state.  Buede also points out that while some people believe that one 
needs to choose between the traditional Vee or the Spiral model, research has shown 
“that the spiral activities can be mapped onto the Vee model without swapping any 
activities in time.”  Both the Iterative Vee and the Spiral-mapped Vee are pictured below 
in Figures 2.12 and 2.13. 
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Figure 2.12 – The Iterative Vee (Buede, 2000) 
Time
 
Figure 2.13 – The Spiral-mapped Vee (after Buede, 
2000)
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2.4 Summary 
 
 This chapter introduced the DoD decision support system, with an emphasis on 
the JCIDS and NSSAP.  Documentation, research, and articles pertaining to these 
decision support systems was reviewed and presented by major theme, for the purpose of 
answering the investigative questions listed in Chapter One and shaping the additional 
research described in Chapter Three.   
 Acquisition challenges have existed since the days of George Washington (Lord, 
2006).  But the string of modifications, some minor and many major, indicate that 
acquisition reform is a real issue because an acceptable policy has not been developed or 
has not been implemented properly. 
The 2001 QDR and 2003 Transformation Planning Guidance identify very 
clearly, a number of objectives for DoD transformation—acquisitions included.  Those 
objectives are further highlighted in the JCIDS and NSSAP guiding documentation and 
can be summarized as joint operations, intelligence exploitation (through netcentricity), 
developing new warfighting concepts (capability-based), and delivering new capability 
(evolutionary).  However, supporting documentation specifying implementation of these 
concepts appears to be absent or to not have been considered such as the need for 
capability management of SoS engineering (SoSE).  This absence causes confusion 
between capabilities and requirements and between evolutionary acquisitions and its 
development processes, and results in no significant operational change in space system 
procurement.  Technology issues were also discussed—specifically the debate between 
using evolutionary or revolutionary strategies to incorporate technology.  The literature 
review closed with a brief explanation of how DoD and the commercial world define an 
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evolutionary strategy and system development strategies to develop the technical 
composition of a system. 
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III. Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
 This chapter will address the qualitative procedure, the research design type, the 
researcher’s role, the data collection procedures, the data analysis procedures, and the 
steps taken to verify the research. 
3.2 A Qualitative Procedure 
 The format of this chapter has been closely modeled after Creswell’s account of a 
qualitative procedure in Chapter Nine of his book titled Research Design: Qualitative 
and Quantitative Approaches (Creswell, 1994).  This methodology will describe a 
qualitative procedure, the case study design, the researcher’s role, the data collection 
procedures, the data analysis procedures, and the steps taken to verify the research. 
3.2.1 Why Qualitative? 
 The purpose of this research is to identify how effective the integrated 
deployment of the CJCSI 3170 and the NSSAP 03-01 has been for national space 
systems.  This problem requires a qualitative approach for a number of reasons, 
supported by Morse. 
Characteristics of a qualitative research problem are: (a) the 
concept is ‘immature’ due to a conspicuous lack of theory 
and previous research; (b) a notion that the available theory 
may be inaccurate, inappropriate, incorrect, or biased; (c) a 
need exists to explore and describe the phenomena and to 
develop theory; or (d) the nature of the phenomenon may 
not be suited to quantitative measures (Morse, 1991). 
 
Such a problem as the one examined in this research fits a number of the above 
characteristics in one way or another, but most significantly fits characteristics a and c.  
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As the literature review in chapter two has shown, there is very little scientific research 
that has been conducted on the matter.  While some literature on product development is 
available, usually pertaining to the commercial world, the overall concept of identifying 
military deficiencies and translating those into solutions is extremely limited.  Much of 
the literature looking at this problem seems to focus on identifying broad problems with 
the entire system and lacks a validated proposal of theory or solutions, and is limited to 
the authors’ experiences.   
As for characteristic b, this research makes no suggestion that the existing process 
and acquisition theory is “inaccurate, inappropriate, incorrect, or biased.”  Instead, it 
attempts to simply identify the effectiveness of implementation at this point for three 
space programs and if applicable, identify areas for improvement.   
Due to the complexity of the process and the need for more research on the 
subject, this research is not suited for a quantitative approach at this time—not to say that 
a quantitative approach will never be applicable.  Quantitative approaches are excellent 
for removing or accounting for biases and assumptions, if those are known and can be 
controlled. 
3.2.2 The Assumptions of Qualitative Designs  
 Although a qualitative approach is definitely appropriate for the proposed 
problem, it is important to understand the assumptions that accompany such an approach.  
Merriam describes those as follows. 
1. Qualitative researchers are concerned primarily with 
process, rather than outcomes or products. 
 
2. Qualitative researchers are interested in meaning—how 
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people make sense of their lives, experiences, and their 
structures of the world. 
 
3. The qualitative researcher is the primary instrument for 
data collection and analysis.  Data are mediated through 
this human instrument, rather than through inventories, 
questionnaires, or machines. 
 
4. Qualitative research involves fieldwork.  The researcher 
physically goes to the people, setting, site, or institution to 
observe or record behavior in its natural setting. 
 
5. Qualitative research is descriptive in that the researcher 
is interested in process, meaning, and understanding gained 
through words or pictures. 
 
6. The process of qualitative research is inductive in that 
the researcher builds abstractions, concepts, hypotheses, 
and theories from details (Merriam, 1988). 
 
These assumptions will be readily apparent in the next section describing the 
design type. 
3.3 The Type of Design 
3.3.1 Specific Qualitative Design 
There are a number of research strategies that apply to problems involving the 
social sciences.  Determining which strategy to use depends on the form of the research 
question, the researcher’s ability to control surrounding events, and whether or not the 
focus is on contemporary events (Yin, 2003).  For the problem proposed, a case study 
will best answer the question because a case study answers how and why questions, does 
not require control of the environment, and focuses on contemporary events (Yin, 2003).  
In contrast, an experiment could answer the same questions and focus on contemporary 
events as well, but would require control of the environment.  A historical strategy could 
also answer the same questions and not require control of the environment, but would not 
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focus on contemporary events.  These methods can be quantitative or qualitative; 
however for the reasons mentioned in the previous section, the case study will be 
qualitative in its application to this problem.  Yin (2003) defines case studies with two 
propositions:  
 
3.3.2 Characteristics of the Design  
 Case studies have five important components (Yin, 2003) that will be discussed in 
the context of the problem this research addresses.  Those components are a study’s 
questions, propositions, unit of analysis, links between the data and propositions, and the 
criteria for interpreting the findings. 
 Study Questions.  The study question is the focus of the research.  In this case, the 
research attempts to answer how effective the integrated deployment of the CJCSI 3170 
and the NSSAP 03-01 has been for national space systems. 
 Study Propositions.  Propositions direct the focus of research and are frequently 
present in social science research, unless the purpose of the research is exploratory.  In 
that case, such propositions are unnecessary because the exploration topic has already 
been selected and does not require focus.  There are three propositions within this 
1. A case study is an empirical inquiry that 
• investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially 
when 
• the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident 
 
2. The case study inquiry 
• copes with the technically distinctive situation in which there will be many 
more variables of interest than data points, and as one result 
• relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in a 
triangulating fashion, and as another result 
• benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data 
collection and analysis (Yin, 2003) 
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research effort.  Those propositions are: (1) organizations at different levels in the process 
may have a different understanding of what the new guidance proposes; (2) space 
systems, following the same guidance, may implement the guidance differently; (3) the 
decision process required for such guidance to be effective is inadequate. 
 Unit of Analysis. The unit of analysis to be studied is each stake holding 
organization in the approval chain for a new system to be developed or an existing 
system to be modified, based on an identified capability deficiency.   These organizations 
will be identified in the context of three space systems, making this a multiple case study. 
 The last two components, Linking Data to Propositions and Criteria for 
Interpreting the Findings will be discussed as Data Analysis Procedures in section 3.6. 
3.4 The Researcher’s Role 
3.4.1 Past Experiences of Researcher 
In June of 2002, the researcher was assigned to the MILSATCOM (Military 
Satellite Communications) Joint Program Office (MJPO).  The Joint Program Office had 
a number of interesting roles in addition to being a traditional System Program Office 
(SPO).  The organization was comprised of personnel from the Air Force, Army, and 
Navy, reflecting their joint interest in the mission and success of the programs.  MJPO 
did not house a single satellite; rather, the program office was responsible for the 
management of a number of satellite programs in various stages of development, co-
located at Los Angeles AFB and Hanscom AFB.  Additionally, the MJPO managed the 
acquisition of the necessary terminals to communicate with the satellites, being 
developed at Hanscom AFB.  A program office managing both the satellites and their 
respective terminals was traditionally referred to as a “basket SPO.”  Today, that scenario 
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is more frequently described as an office managing a system-of-systems (SoS).  
Similarly, a program office managing a number of similar functioning systems, such as 
communication satellites (although they ultimately perform different missions at different 
frequencies), is said to be an office managing a family-of-systems (FoS).   
3.4.2 Selection Steps 
Understanding the acquisition process, the author identified a number of 
organizations to interview both vertically and horizontally.  By vertical, organizations 
were selected along an approving chain of command from top to bottom, requirements 
generation to operator use.  In this manner, data could be analyzed at all phases of an 
acquisition program.  By horizontal, the author asked the same questions at all levels, for 
three different space programs.  This would indicate if policies were implemented to the 
same extent, or documented for exceptions, throughout space programs.  Programs in 
different phases of the acquisition process, meaning that some were initiated before and 
after the policy change, were selected to maximize testing the extent of implementation. 
Both organizations and programs selected for research were selected based on 
criteria that would lead to diversified results enabling comparison.  Specific interview 
participants were selected based on the author’s contacts and “snowball sampling”—
asking the interview participants who they thought should be contacted.  Although 
snowball sampling is considered to have a number of biases when studying social 
interactions, those biases are mitigated by the fact that social relationships were not being 
studied and outweighed by the value that snowball sampling can provide when it is 
difficult to find interview participants.  
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3.4.3 Human Subjects and Ethical Issues 
 Interview participants can be difficult to find for a number of reasons, but in this 
particular case, one reason may be the fear of retribution resulting in negative 
consequences since interview participants are being asked to comment on the 
effectiveness of policies created by superiors.  For this reason, all personal information 
will remain completely confidential throughout the entire process, including thesis 
publication and any related articles that may result.  Additionally, the research was 
approved through the Air Force Institute of Technology’s Human Subject Research 
Approval process.  This information was provided to the interview participant in an 
interview invitation letter and before the interview was actually conducted.  The 
interview invitation letter is located in Appendix A. 
3.5 Data Collection Procedures 
3.5.1 Parameters of Data Collection 
 Individuals from all levels of the Joint Capability Integrated Development System 
(JCIDS) and the National Security Space Acquisition Process (NSSAP), as described in 
Figure 2.02, were interviewed on location, whenever possible.  Specifically, individuals 
have been identified from the following offices. 
• National Security Space Office (NSSO) 
• Secretary of the Air Force Directorate of Space Acquisitions (SAF/USA) 
• Headquarters Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Air & Space Operations 
(AF/XO) 
• Headquarters Air Force Space Command Directorate of Requirements 
(AFSPC/A5) 
• Global Positioning System (GPS) Program Office, System Engineers 
• Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) Program Office, System Engineers, Users  
• Transformational Communications Satellite (TSAT) Program Office, System 
Engineers 
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• Aerospace Corporation 
• Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC) Acquisition Center of Excellence 
(ACE) 
• Defense Systems Management Course (DSMC) Instructors 
• Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) Instructors 
• Defense Acquisition University (DAU) Instructors 
 
The questions were focused on these individuals’ roles in the acquisition process, 
before and after the implementation of CJCSI 3170 and NSSAP 03-01, as well as how 
they view the roles of others.  The questions also focused on the implementation of the 
policies. 
3.5.2 Types of Data Collected, Rationale, and Protocol 
 The interviews were comprised of, but not limited to, a standard set of questions 
located below and again in Appendix B.  The semi-structured format of the interview 
provided both structure for analytical purposes, as well as the flexibility to ask follow up 
questions for clarity that may be applied to understanding a specific organization’s role or 
perspective.   
 The standard script included a heading, instructions, standard research questions, 
and participant-specific and/or follow-up questions.  The interview participant’s 
responses were recorded, whenever possible via digital tape recorder.  However, if the 
interview participant preferred, they were able to complete the interview through an e-
mail dialogue.  Although, differences in data collection method are generally not 
preferred (unless analyzing the method), the value in the collection of responses from 
various organizations outweighs the bias that may be introduced through the difference in 
collection method.  All recorded interviews were transcribed into an interview record.  
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Additionally, the interviewer, in this case the author, took written notes to indicate a 
record of points of interest or points requiring follow-up. 
3.6 Data Analysis Procedures 
 Like many other aspects of qualitative case study research, there is no “right way” 
to analyze data (Tesch, 1990; Creswell, 1994); rather, there is no one right way.  There 
are a number of accepted guidelines that can ease the emergence of themes, patterns, and 
theories.  Creswell (1994) suggests a spiral model, aptly appropriate considering the 
subject matter, in which raw data is continually reviewed with a different focus each time 
refining the data and making it usable.  These categories and a brief description of each 
are identified in Figure 3.01.  Tesch (1990) describes a similar, more detailed process in 
eight steps listed below. 
 
1. Get a sense of the whole.  Read through all of the 
transcripts carefully.  Perhaps jot down some ideas as they 
come to mind. 
 
2. Pick one document (one interview)—the most 
interesting, the shortest, the one on the top of the pile.  Go 
through it asking yourself, What is this about? Do not think 
about the “substance” of the information, but rather its 
underlying meaning.  Write thoughts in the margin. 
 
3. When you have completed this task for several 
informants, make a list of all topics.  Cluster together 
similar topics.  Form these topics into columns that might 
be arrayed as major topics, unique topics, and leftovers. 
 
4.  Now take this list and go back to your data.  Abbreviate 
the topics as codes and write the codes next to the 
appropriate segments of the text.  Try out this preliminary 
organizing scheme to see whether new categories and codes 
emerge. 
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5. Find the most descriptive wording for your topics and 
turn them into categories.  Look for reducing your total list 
of categories by grouping topics that relate to each other.  
Perhaps draw lines between your categories to show 
interrelationships. 
 
6. Make a final decision on the abbreviation for each 
category and alphabetize the codes. 
7. Assemble the data material belonging to each category in 
one place and perform a preliminary analysis. 
 
8. If necessary, recode your existing data.  (Tesch, 1990) 
 
 
 
Figure 3.01 – Creswell’s Data Analysis Spiral (after Creswell, 1994) 
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 These processes reflect Dr. Eisenhardt’s (1989) position that case studies can be 
used to build theories if they remain open-ended.  Consequently, developing a more 
structured analysis is difficult without knowing the results of such data collection.  In this 
case, data analysis occurs simultaneously with data collection, data interpretation, and 
report writing (Creswell, 1994).  Therefore, data analysis consists of recognizing themes 
that may indicate how effective the integrated deployment of the CJCSI 3170 and the 
NSSAP 03-01 has been for national space systems. 
3.7 Verification Steps 
 Verification is often considered an indication of truly scientific research 
(Creswell, 1994) but is difficult to formalize in qualitative research.  Consider some of 
the assumptions and desired results of a qualitative process.  The research is usually 
descriptive of a process that the researcher has limited access to; in other words, the 
researcher can not examine every single case at every point in time with everyone 
involved.  The research is also inductive in that the researcher frequently uses it to build 
hypotheses, theories, and models to be tested.  
 With this in mind, it is understandable that some researchers suggest using terms 
such as “authenticity” and “trustworthiness”; however both Creswell (1994) and Miles 
and Huberman (1994) suggest using terms of validity and reliability.  Miles and 
Huberman have also compiled a number of reflective questions that are useful in 
assessing validity and reliability.  Some of Miles and Huberman’s questions are listed 
below that will be used in this research.   
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3.7.1 Internal Validity 
 Creswell and Merriam define internal validity as “the accuracy of the information 
and whether it matches reality.”  Internal validity will be achieved by providing a number 
of the interview participants with the research results and asking them to comment on 
their accuracy in addition to a review of Miles and Huberman’s questions. 
3.7.2 External Validity 
 External validity or transferability or fittingness indicates how “generalizable” the 
conclusions of a study may be (Miles and Huberman, 1994).  There appears to be some 
difference in opinion as far as whether it is good to have a large or a small amount of 
generalizability.  According to Merriam, “the intent of qualitative research is not to 
generalize findings, but to form a unique interpretation of event.”  Miles and Huberman 
take a more balanced approach, commenting that some generalizability is good because 
there is meaning from the research for more people.  However, if the findings are too 
general, they begin to lose their importance. 
3.7.3 Reliability 
 According to Miles and Huberman (1994), “the underlying issue here is whether 
the process of the study is consistent, reasonably stable over time and across researchers 
and methods.”  This research builds-in reliability by examining three different space 
programs, using the same protocol.  “In case study research, in which the investigator 
explores multi-site cases, one can examine whether the same patterns or events or 
thematic constructs are replicated in different settings” (Creswell, 1994). 
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Table 3.01 – Miles and Huberman’s Validity and Reliability Questions (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994) 
 
Internal Validity /  
Credibility / Authenticity 
External Validity / 
Transferability / 
Fittingness 
Reliability / Dependability 
/ Auditability 
2. Does the account “ring 
true,” make sense, seem 
convincing or plausible, 
enable a “vicarious 
presence” for the reader? 
1.  Are the characteristics of 
the original sample of 
persons, settings, processes 
(etc.) fully described 
enough to permit adequate 
comparisons with other 
samples? 
1. Are the research 
questions clear, and are the 
features of the study design 
congruent with them? 
5. Are the presented data 
well linked to the categories 
of prior or emerging theory? 
Do the measures reflect the 
constructs in play? 
3. Is the sampling 
theoretically diverse enough 
to encourage broader 
applicability? 
2. Is the researcher’s role 
and status within the site 
explicitly described? 
8. Are areas of uncertainty 
identified?  (There should 
be some.) 
5. Do the findings include 
enough “thick description” 
for readers to assess the 
potential transferability, 
appropriateness for their 
own settings? 
3. Do findings show 
meaningful parallelism 
across data sources 
(informants, contexts, 
times)? 
10. Have rival explanations 
been actively considered?  
What happened to them? 
6. Does a range of readers 
report the findings to be 
consistent with their own 
experiences? 
4. Are basic paradigms and 
analytic constructs clearly 
specified? 
12. Were the conclusions 
considered to be accurate by 
original informants? If not, 
is there a coherent 
explanation for this? 
7. Are the findings 
congruent with, connected 
to, or confirmatory of prior 
theory?  
5. Were data collected 
across the full range of 
appropriate settings, times, 
respondents, and so on 
suggested by the research 
questions? 
 11. Does the report suggest 
settings where the findings 
could fruitfully be tested 
further? 
8. Were data quality checks 
made (e.g. for bias, deceit, 
informant 
knowledgeability)? 
 12. Have the findings been 
replicated in other studies to 
assess their robustness?  If 
not, could replication efforts 
be mounted easily? 
9. Do multiple observers’ 
accounts converge, in 
instances, settings, or times 
when they might be 
expected to? 
  10. Were any forms of peer 
or colleague review in 
place? 
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3.8 Summary 
 In this chapter, the author addressed various aspects of a qualitative procedure, 
specifically why it was selected for this research and the assumptions that must 
accompany a qualitative procedure.  The multiple case study was announced as the 
research design type.  The definition of a case study and described characteristics of such 
a design type indicated the appropriateness of selection for answering the research 
question: how effective the integrated deployment of the CJCSI 3170 and the NSSAP 03-
01 has been for national space systems.  The researcher’s role was described within the 
context of the researcher’s related experience before the research, and the researcher’s 
role of selecting cases and participants. The data collection procedure and analysis 
procedures were also described. Data collection consisted of horizontal and vertical 
interviews from a number of organizations across multiple programs and with differing 
approval authority.  Data analysis was completed by drawing themes from multiple 
reviews of the data.  The research was verified with measures to address internal and 
external reliability, in addition to reliability.  The results of this methodology are 
discussed in Chapters Four and Five. 
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IV. Results and Discussion 
4.1 Introduction  
 In addition to reviewing relevant research, articles, commission reports, and 
guiding documentation, interviews were conducted across a number of organizations 
involved in the acquisition process.  These organizations included system acquirers, 
users, air and space requirement developers, architecture designers, space policy 
directors, and experts from the Defense System Management Course, Defense 
Acquisition University, and Air Force Institute of Technology.  Due to the policies of the 
Investigative Research Board, the specific comments can not be published if they can be 
attributed to an individual.  Since individuals, frequently used personal examples and 
were guaranteed confidentiality, the results of analysis are captured through the answers 
to the investigative questions. 
 Recommendations are included in the investigative questions and in the following 
section.  Some investigative questions were answered through another question’s 
response and do not have a separate answer. 
4.2 Investigative Question 
 What are the goals of an EA strategy? The goal of an evolutionary acquisition 
strategy is to reduce the amount of time it takes to get added appropriate capability to the 
user and to reduce cost growth.  This is done by employing the strategy described as 
follows.  
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 What is an evolutionary acquisition (EA) strategy? To the Department of Defense 
space community, an evolutionary acquisition strategy describes the acquisition of a 
number of blocks of similar items with increasing capability.  The added capability is 
planned two to three blocks earlier than the block that the capability will be incorporated 
in.  Reasons for added capability may be a changing threat or a change in available 
technology.  This is especially important since DoD does not drive technological 
development like it did 50 years ago (Brown, 2004).   Although, this is more visible 
outside of space systems, the development of Spaceship One and plans in Virginia and 
Florida for space tourism are examples of an outside and commercial driver. 
 While this appears to produce similar systems to those produced in the past (i.e. 
blocks with increasing capability), there is a different emphasis in how technology is 
planned.  A 100% solution is no longer sought for in the first block, with additional 
capability added in following blocks.  Instead, the first block should be about an 80% 
solution and must provide an improved capability over the current system according to 
the definition in NSSAP 03-01, or else not approved until mature technology is available.  
However, some interviewees stated that among the user community, there is a fear that an 
initial block will be developed to lay the groundwork for the following block to “leap 
frog” over the capability of the former system, but the initial block will actually take a 
step back in capability.  Or, that the initial block may be such a slight improvement that 
the second block will not be procured because the value to cost ratio was so low.  To the 
first problem, this is by NSSAP 03-01 definition, not an evolutionary acquisition.  To the 
second problem, if the increment was achieved with the cost that was budgeted, then 
there would be no change in perceived value between the time the system was approved 
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and the first block was completed.  This is possible if fairly mature technology is 
incorporated from the beginning, because cost estimates will be more accurate.  In 
addition to incorporating mature technology to reduce cost, EA attempts to reduce cost by 
reducing risk through the selection of the development process.  This is discussed in a 
later section.  
 Because an 80% solution means that there is at least 20% more coming, and even 
more through technology improvements where applicable, there is an increased need to 
make arrangements up front to allow for this capability to be added.  The space 
community understands this well because space-based systems can not cost effectively be 
upgraded once launched, at this time.  Therefore, any incremental improvements to a 
space system have traditionally been achieved through ground-based software and 
hardware upgrades for terminals or by launching backward compatible satellites to 
supplement an existing constellation. 
None of the interviewees viewed an evolutionary acquisition strategy as a new 
strategy for the development of space systems.  In truth, as defined in NSSAP 03-01, 
many of today’s space systems could have operated under an evolutionary strategy.  But, 
the results may have been different if full understanding of the goals of EA was achieved.  
For example, interviewees were asked to comment on the current, and past where 
applicable, acquisition strategies for GPS, SBIRS, and TSAT.  Several interviewees 
referred to the initial acquisition strategy for all three programs as the “Big Bang”—
meaning that the programs tried to give the user all the capability that was requested in 
the initial block.  Some program offices seemed to realize sooner than others that this 
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could not be achieved within cost and schedule constraints and incorporated a more 
evolutionary, rather than revolutionary, strategy.  
GPS was initiated before an EA strategy was the preferred strategy and used 
block development to procure the first blocks and models of the satellite.  At the time, the 
strategy was not considered evolutionary, but additional capability was planned for 
following blocks from program initiation.  GPS is now considered to be an evolutionary 
acquisition and the third block will employ spiral development.   
SBIRS was also initiated before an EA strategy was the preferred strategy.  The 
traditional waterfall model was used to design the system and the system was acquired 
through a process known as Total System Performance Responsibility (TSPR).  TSPR 
was created to reduce lengthy and cumbersome government oversight and allow the 
contractor more flexibility to use best commercial practices to develop a system as long 
as the overall objectives were met.  When the SBIRS program first breached its 
Acquisition Program Baseline (APB), a decision was made to switch oversight from the 
contractor back to the government.  Additional requirements were levied on the SBIRS 
program office and the acquisition of SBIRS began to take a more evolutionary form in 
development, but not in acquisition.  Necessary acquisition and operational level tasks 
were broken into “effectivities;” however, the completion of one effectivity did not add 
an improved capability because the effectivity was only effective if the whole system was 
operational.  There are a number of differing opinions within SBIRS as to whether an 
evolutionary acquisition strategy, as defined in NSSAP 03-01, was ever used.   
The concept for TSAT was initiated slightly before EA became the preferred 
strategy and one interviewee said that it would have been an incremental development 
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process anyway.  TSAT’s use of an evolutionary acquisition strategy employing 
incremental development was done “to show reduction of risk through early launch.”  
The space community’s employment of an EA strategy has not achieved the 
desired goals for at least two reasons.  The 80% solution has not really been adopted as 
an acceptable solution, probably because of some of the concerns described above.  The 
second reason is that the space community is still looking for a revolutionary 
advancement.  Transformation seems to be viewed more as a radical change than small 
evolving changes to modernize.  Even if employed correctly, an EA strategy has many 
new ramifications given the transformed environment that space systems are operating in.  
This will be discussed in following sections on capability-acquisitions.   
 How is an EA strategy implemented?  The technological portion of an acquisition 
strategy is implemented through a development process.  For DoD space systems, the 
practical difference between spiral or incremental development is somewhat gray, but all 
of the interviewees differentiated the terms correctly by the degree to which the desired 
end state of a system is known.  However, the development process occurs within a 
block, according to Figure 2.07, and the desired end state of the block that is being 
developed should be known.  Therefore the distinguishing characteristic of degree to 
which the end state is known, does not really make sense when considering a block.  
Similarly, if considering the system instead of the block, is the desired end state ever 
known if the purpose of EA is to allow for changing threats or technology?  This 
differentiation between development processes should be removed and one process, such 
as the spiral-mapped Vee model could be used to develop a block.  The spiral-mapped 
Vee model is the same model depicted on the Integrated Defense Acquisition, 
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Technology, and Logistics Life Cycle Management Framework from 2004.  This map is 
located in the back cover of the thesis.     
 There is more to an acquisition strategy than the technical development aspect.  
There are contractual, financial, testing, and logistical implications as well that really 
have not been considered in NSSAP 03-01.  When asked to comment on evolutionary 
acquisition, one interviewee colorfully responded “What’s a spiral look like?  A screw—
and that’s what it means for logistics.” 
 As shown in the above statement, it is not uncommon for the terms evolutionary 
acquisitions and spiral development to be interchanged, however all of the academic-
based (meaning AFIT, DAU, and DSMC) interviewees could distinguish between the 
terms, while users and some program office interviewees had more difficulty.  This may 
be attributed to the fact that the terms evolutionary, spiral, and incremental are used 
almost interchangeably (Larman, 2003) in commercial organizations and in particular, 
software design and systems engineering communities.  These specifically describe 
development processes, with the exception of software engineering which can produce 
useful code after one spiral.  Perhaps a worthy metaphor for clarification of what DoD’s 
EA strategy means even for software intensive space systems is the term “evolutionary 
deployment.”  Figure 4.01 depicts evolutionary deployment and development. 
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Figure 4.01 – Evolutionary Deployment v. Development (Gamache, 2006) 
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 What development processes are alternatives to evolutionary acquisitions?  
Development processes are not alternatives to acquisition strategies.  As mentioned 
above, they represent the technical portion of a system.  An alternative to an EA strategy 
would be one in which all desired capability was achieved in one block.  This alternative 
could even use spiral development and not be an evolutionary acquisition system.  
Alternative development processes were described in Chapter Two.  However, several 
systems engineering experts recommended that the Vee be used because it is similar to 
the traditional waterfall model if used once or similar to a spiral if repeated as more 
information about the desired capability is available. 
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 What is a capability-based acquisition?  There was a major difference in how the 
term capability-based acquisition was defined between literature and interviewees.  
Literature tended to define the term as requirements and acquisition processes focused on 
meeting a desired capability through a number of means, including Family-of-Systems, 
System-of-Systems, or a traditional platform.  This concept was supported by the 
emphasis on interoperable systems for joint users, especially for information systems 
including space systems.  Interviewees defined capability-based acquisitions as a 
requirements process that was more relaxed in the extent to which requirements were 
identified or defined, with the goal of giving the contractor more flexibility in how a 
system is developed.  These two ideas are almost mutually exclusive.  The literature 
definition is supported in policy, while the interviewees’ definition is in sharp contrast to 
findings of several commissions investigating acquisition problems over the past twenty 
years.  Specifically, the interoperability that is necessary to achieve a joint netcentric 
environment requires adherence to specific standards in several areas.   
 The literature definition of capability-based acquisitions has a significant impact 
on an evolutionary acquisition strategy.  Not only do program managers have to manage 
a number of evolving blocks, making trade-offs between blocks to reduce risk or 
incorporate new technology or address a different threat.  Now they must make these 
decisions considering the affects to other systems within a program’s FoS or SoS.  
Disciplined systems engineering practices are more important than ever to make such 
vertical (between blocks) and horizontal (between systems) trade-offs.  Figure 4.02 
depicts horizontal and vertical trade-offs for a typical space system.  Figure 4.03 depicts 
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the systems engineering complexity between two systems that must be interoperable to 
provide a specified capability.   
  
Figure 4.02 – Horizontal and Vertical Trade-offs for a Space System (Gamache, 2006) 
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 At this time, these trade-offs are made largely by both formal and informal 
committees, although the committee membership differed amongst interviewee 
responses.  Program offices and SMC at large, have chief system engineers that monitor 
these trade-offs and provide recommendations, but an overarching capability has no chief 
systems engineer or director responsible for making such decisions across platforms and 
services.  In addition to systems engineers trained at the system, program, and capability 
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levels, DoD acquisitions could benefit from switching service-specific Program 
Executive Officers (PEO) to joint Capability Acquisition Executives (CAE).  This would 
reduce redundancy, excessive levels of oversight and burden on the J-8, and avoid trade-
off decisions being made by what one interviewee described as a room full of “500-lb 
gorillas.” 
 
 
Figure 4.03 – Horizontal and Vertical Trade-offs for Interoperable Space Systems 
(Gamache, 2006) 
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 What are the goals of capability-based acquisitions? The main goal of capability-
based acquisitions is to develop acquisition solutions that are responsive to the way DoD 
conducts operations.  Specifically, reductions in funding and changes in threats require 
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more agile and efficient warfighting, which can be accomplished by eliminating un-
needed redundancy of efforts and people and supplementing with easier information 
exchange.  Capability-based acquisitions accomplishes this by encouraging solutions to 
be joint, interoperable, and netcentric and emphasizing the development of a capability 
over the platform.  
 How are capability-based acquisitions implemented?  JCIDS’ guidance primarily 
addresses JCIDS oversight, review, and documentation of the decision support system.  
There is little to no appropriate implementation guidance for the program level.  Aside 
from there not being DoD-directed acquisition policy, Air Force Instruction 63-1 
“Capability-Based Acquisition System” (2003) does not give any guidance on 
implementation, let alone define the term.  “Joint” is used only twice in the definition for 
warfighter and in referencing a document.  AFI 63-1 also specifically states that it does 
not apply to space systems. 
 How does the acquisition workforce view the implementation of JCIDS and 
NSSAP documentation? None of the interviewees experienced or expected to experience 
a reduction in capability development time or cost overruns.  Several reasons were cited 
by the interviewees including: 
• Too much technology development after committing to a solution 
• Funding profile not matching identified space system profile of 80% in 
development and production and 20% in operations and maintenance 
• Unstable funding or not enough reserve (25%) for Program Manager flexibility 
• No day-to-day operations change in JCIDS from RGS, other than joint focus 
which does not trickle down through Service 
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4.3 Recommendations 
The results and discussion of the literature review, interviews, and investigative 
questions led to recommendations in the categories of: 
• Acquisition Expertise 
• Requirements Control 
• Capable Technology and Industrial Base  
• Realistic Budgeting 
 
Some recommendations are applicable to system acquisition outside of the space 
community.  Although many of these recommendations were included in the discussion 
section, they are consolidated in the subsequent sections.    
4.3.1 Acquisition Expertise 
Service PEOs need to be converted into Joint Capability Acquisition Executives 
(CAEs), responsible for acquiring a capability through the management of a portfolio of 
programs.  Joint CAEs would be responsible for ensuring executable APBs for 
supporting programs and PMs must have adequate pre-acquisition funding to assemble 
people, tools and data to establish executable APBs with the CAE.  Expertise could be 
cultivated by requiring a rotational assignment in industry and systems engineering 
before becoming a PM.  Level three space professional certification would be a requisite 
for all PM and CAE positions for space systems. 
4.3.2 Requirements Control 
Controlling requirements is necessary for implementing an evolutionary 
acquisition strategy, but even more critical with the acquisition of capabilities through 
SoSs and FoSs.  The Association for Operations Management recommends limiting key 
management requirements to somewhere between three and seven.  With the help of the 
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users, CAEs must establish or accept no more than five key performance parameters 
(KPPs) per system supporting the overall capability, for example.  This will allow 
program managers (PM) to have more degrees of freedom in how their portion of 
capability is provided.  Similarly, with the help of the users, PMs should further limit the 
number of KPPs per block.  It is true that changes in threats, technology, or available 
knowledge may require an additional validated KPP, however, limiting KPPs per system 
or increment will force system development to move forward and use following 
increments as they were meant to be used to shorten cycle time and account for these 
changes. 
 Requirements control can also be accomplished at the capability-level.  As the 
expert on currently available capability, CAEs would be responsible for completing 
Analyses of Alternatives (AoAs) instead of Service-specific requirements organizations 
working with a System Program Office.  To accomplish this, CAEs with system-of-
systems engineering (SoSE) expertise would need to invest in accredited SoSE tools and 
SoS engineers with JCIDS and NSSAP Joint Program Office experience.  Finally, the 
CAE should establish SoS measures of effectiveness (MOEs).  After all, “it is important 
to understand that ‘metrics matter.’ We must be able to define success and measure it. On 
the battlefield, we can easily measure the performance of the capabilities provided 
through the Global Positioning System or Military Satellite Communication. We need to 
do the same as we develop the next generation space capabilities. We must know where, 
when and how we are succeeding…and failing” (Lord, 2006).  
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4.3.3 Capable Technology & Industrial Base 
 The commercial market for space has been rather unpredictable.  With the 
consolidation of defense space contractors, the space system community needs a better 
mechanism to “pull” DoD science and technology investments and to provide guidance to 
the industrial base for independent research and development (IRAD) and capital 
investment, ensuring that technology matures at a steady or accelerated rate.   
4.3.4 Realistic Budgeting and Funding 
Budget instability was a major concern among interviewees.  Two 
recommendations can be made based on two main causes of inaccurate budgets being not 
enough information or designing to not enough money.   
The space system community needs a methodology for creating more accurate 
cost estimates of Horizontal Integration (HI), immature technologies, and space industrial 
base restructuring costs.  Additionally, the Young Panel recommendation of an 80/20 
ratio of funds with a 25% margin and not using contractor estimates in competitive 
situations would increase the accuracy of initial cost estimates.  Requiring that SPO cost 
estimates and Independent Cost Estimates reconcile at KDPs would provide insight into 
problem areas and reduce the frequency and severity of unforeseen overrun.  
Although not adequately examined due to the scope of the research, one 
recommendation could be made for joint systems, such as space systems and information 
systems, being funded out of separate joint funding, as opposed to service-specific 
funding. 
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4.4 Summary 
 Chapter Four summarized the results of the literature review and interviews 
analysis with respect to the investigative questions.  Due to restrictions placed by the 
Human Research Board the names, organizations, and specific quotations could not be 
included in the published thesis.  The synthesized data identified four areas of 
recommendations that would lead to the improvement of the interaction between the 
JCIDS and NSSAP. 
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V. Conclusion 
5.1 Introduction 
 The results and recommendations presented in Chapter Four lay the framework 
for a theory to be presented.  DoD’s challenge is to create an environment that enables 
program managers’ mission success by ensuring that the acquisition program baselines 
for all National Security Space systems are executable and stable.  That environment lies 
within the overlap of the JCIDS, NSSAP, and PPBE Process.   
5.2 Theory Building 
 Once in that environment, a program manager will be faced with many decisions 
that must be made considering six factors, or trade space areas.  Those areas for trade 
space are: requirements, cost, schedule, risk, system concept, and the available 
technology and industrial base.  Figure 5.01 illustrates this concept with the margin for 
trade in the middle.  
 Previous models have presented a similar decision making box, typically 
considering cost, schedule, and performance (or requirements).  However, research shows 
that many more factors play a role in determining mission success for space systems.  
The employment of an evolutionary strategy in the NSSAP attempts to make use of the 
most current, mature technologies and mitigate risk, in addition to lowering cost through 
risk reduction.  “Pursuit of leap-ahead capabilities will need to accommodate risk 
reduction and technology maturation, most likely through spiral development and 
evolutionary progress.” (Neuman, 2006)  Similarly, the change to capability-based 
acquisitions in the JCIDS, not only affects requirement generation, but also opens the 
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door for employing system-of-systems (SoSs) to meet a capability deficiency, requiring 
attention be paid to system concept. 
 
 
Figure 5.01 – The Program Manager’s Decision Making Box (Gamache, 2006) 
 
        
                              
 “Like any policies, how you deal with them is key” (Coyle, 2003) and the same is 
true for the CJCS series and NSSAP 03-01.  While the policies are fairly sound, with a 
number of good ideas like NSSAP 03-01’s independent program assessment (IPA), the 
tools, mechanisms, and people are not in place to implement the policies with their 
desired intent.   
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 The recommendations presented in Chapter Four state some of the tools and how 
to acquire the people needed to implement such policies, enabling better interaction 
between JCIDS and NSSAP. 
5.3 Future Research  
 Additional research can be conducted in a number of areas.  Because JCIDS 
applies to all services and a number of the recommendations would affect all services, 
similar research should be accomplished within the sister services before attempting to 
correct any problems with the JCIDS.  The concept of joint Capability Acquisition 
Executives managing architectures of SoSs and FoSs must be further developed.   
 As mentioned in Chapter One, a limitation of the research was that it did not 
address the PPBE Process.  Budget stability was a major theme in the interviews and to a 
lesser extent in the literature; however, it was not examined in this research to keep the 
scope manageable.  The PPBE Process should also be reviewed for space systems. 
 In the author’s opinion, one of the most important areas of future research is in 
DoD’s implementation practices.  Specifically, one could research whether tools, 
mechanisms, and skilled people were in place before or after a policy was released.  
DoD’s philosophy on the role of policies could also be defined. 
 Finally, the recommendations of this thesis should be tested before implemented.  
While literature and interview data support the recommendations, a more thorough 
investigation as to the implications of such recommendations should be made before 
implementation.   
  74
Appendix A 
Interview Invitation Letter 
 
Dear (Interview Participant’s Name), 
 
 I am a graduate student at the Air Force Institute of Technology, studying 
Research and Development Management and Space Systems.  My master’s thesis 
research is examining the interaction between the Joint Capability Integration and 
Development System (JCIDS) and the Defense Acquisition System (DAS).  As your 
schedule permits, I would like to set up an appointment to interview you about your 
experiences on the subject. 
 
 My research includes interviews with people throughout the acquisition process 
for developing the nation’s space systems, from the individuals operating the resultant 
system to those individuals who identified the existing deficiency requiring such a system 
to be developed.  This research will describe the degree of interaction between the JCIDS 
and the DAS, identify major themes, and propose recommendations for areas of 
improvement as these areas are discovered. 
 
 The interview will follow, but is not limited to, a standard set of questions that are 
included.  This semi-structured approach will allow for the analysis of responses to same 
questions across all interviews, as well as provide for any additional information that may 
be helpful to understanding an organization’s perspective or provide clarity.  Information 
collected during the interview will remain confidential throughout the entire process, 
including the resulting thesis and related articles.  The interview questions have been 
approved through the Air Force Institute of Technology’s process for Human Subject 
Research Approval. 
 
 Please respond, indicating whether you are or are not willing to participate in such 
an interview.  If willing, also indicate a time and date convenient to you and falling on or 
before 31 Jan 2006 for the interview to occur.  With your permission, the interview will 
be recorded.  The interview may also be administered through an e-mail dialogue if you 
prefer. 
 
 Thank you in advance for your time, consideration, and willingness to participate 
in my thesis research.  If you have any questions, I can be reached by phone at 937-xxx-
xxxx and by e-mail at joyce.gamache@afit.edu. 
 
 
       Sincerely, 
       Joyce Gamache 
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Appendix B 
Survey Questions 
 
Name and Rank: 
Duty Title and Description: 
Relevant Coursework (DSMC, DAU) or Seminars: 
Interview Time and Method: 
 
Instructions 
You are reminded that the personal information and responses collected today 
will remain completely confidential.  They are collected to develop themes and measure 
the effectiveness of the implementation of the CJCSI 3170 and NSSAP 03-01 on the Joint 
Capability Integrated Development System (JCIDS) and the Defense Acquisition System 
(DAS).   
With your permission, this interview will be recorded by digital voice recorder.  
You will be asked the eight standard questions that were e-mailed to you earlier and may 
be asked additional participant-specific, follow-up questions.  Please answer the seven 
questions with respect to GPS, SBIRS, TSAT, and any other relevant space program that 
you have had experience with.  Thank you for participating in this research. 
 
Standard Questions 
1. Please describe your organization’s role in the JCIDS & DAS processes. 
 
2. The NSSAP 03-01 defines evolutionary acquisitions, spiral development and 
incremental development as follows. 
 
EA is defined as an acquisition approach that delivers capability in 
increments, recognizing up front the need for future capability 
improvements. This approach requires collaboration among the user, 
tester, and developer. The two main processes to perform EA are: 
a) Spiral Development. In this process, a desired capability is 
identified, but the end-state requirements are not known at program 
initiation. Those requirements are refined through demonstration and risk 
management, there is continuous user feedback, and each increment 
provides the user the best possible capability. The requirements for future 
increments depend on feedback from users and technology maturation. 
b) Incremental Development. In this process, a desired capability is 
identified, an end-state requirement is known, and that requirement is met 
over time by development of several increments, each dependent on 
available mature technology. 
 
Do the following programs employ an evolutionary acquisition (EA) strategy?  If so, does 
the program use incremental or spiral development and why was this method selected 
over the alternative? 
GPS –  
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SBIRS –  
TSAT –  
Other – 
 
3. Who is responsible, and what processes or tools do they use, for making trade-offs 
between the capabilities provided by the system-of-systems (SoS) or family-of-systems 
(FoS) at the mission level, and then deciding the space system acquisition spirals or 
increments?  What sort of documentation is required (if any) to reflect this? 
GPS –  
SBIRS –  
TSAT –  
Other –  
 
4. Has, or will, the NSSAP 03-01 implementation of EA on space programs dramatically 
reduced capability timelines and space program overruns?  Why or why not?  
GPS –  
SBIRS –  
TSAT –  
Other –  
 
5. Has, or will, the CJCSI 3170 implementation of the JCIDS process dramatically 
reduced capability timelines and space program overruns?  Why or why not?  
GPS –  
SBIRS –  
TSAT –  
Other –  
 
6. Prior to the implementation of EA through DoDD 5000.1 and DoDI 5000.2 for the 
DAS and NSSAP 03-01 for space systems, what kind of acquisition process would have 
been undertaken? 
GPS –  
SBIRS –  
TSAT –  
Other –  
 
7. Please review the diagrams of CJCSI 3170 and NSSAP 03-01 products and events as a 
function of major program phase.  Please identify what has worked well and why. 
GPS –  
SBIRS –  
TSAT –  
Other –  
 
8. Please review the diagrams of CJCSI 3170 and NSSAP 03-01 products and events as a 
function of major program phase.  Please identify what has not worked well and why. 
GPS –  
SBIRS –  
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TSAT –  
Other –  
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Figure 3.1 – CJCSI 3170 Products and Events as a Function of Major Phase (CJCSI 
3170, 2005) 
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Figure 3.2 – NSSAP 03-01 Products and Events as a Function of Major Program Phase, 
Small Quantity System Model (NSSAP 03-01, 2004) 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3 – NSSAP 03-01 Products and Events as a Function of Major Program Phase, 
Large Quantity System Model (NSSAP 03-01, 2004) 
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